Unconditional Acceptance: The Supreme Court of Missouri\u27s Interpretation of Missouri Revised Statutes Section 167.131 by McCoy, Missy
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 76 
Issue 3 Summer 2011 Article 14 
Summer 2011 
Unconditional Acceptance: The Supreme Court of Missouri's 
Interpretation of Missouri Revised Statutes Section 167.131 
Missy McCoy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Missy McCoy, Unconditional Acceptance: The Supreme Court of Missouri's Interpretation of Missouri 
Revised Statutes Section 167.131, 76 MO. L. REV. (2011) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol76/iss3/14 
This Conference is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
NOTE
Unconditional Acceptance: The Supreme
Court of Missouri's Interpretation of
Missouri Revised Statutes Section 167.131




The unaccredited St. Louis Public School District had an average daily
attendance of approximately 23,550 students in 2009,1 more than ten times
the average attendance of the neighboring Clayton School District.2 In
Turner v. School District of Clayton, the Supreme Court of Missouri faced
the novel issue of interpreting Missouri Revised Statues section 167.131 as it
related to children who resided in the currently unaccredited St. Louis Public
School District but wished to attend schools in the accredited Clayton School
District.4 After determining that the unaccredited district was responsible for
the tuition of students who attended accredited schools, the majority conclud-
ed that under section 167.131, when a child of an unaccredited school district
chooses to transfer to an accredited district in the same or adjoining county,
the school to which the child transfers must accept the child.5 This interpreta-
* B.S., Truman State University, 2002; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri
School of Law, 2012; Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2011-12. I would like
to thank the members of the Missouri Law Review for their many rounds of helpful
edits. I am grateful to my husband, Ben, for his constant encouragement and support
in both the writing of this Note and all of my endeavors.
1. MODESE ANNUAL REPORT OF SCHOOL DATA - ST. Louis CITY FINANCE
REPORT 2006-2010, Mo. DEP'T OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC. (Dec. 7,
2010) [hereinafter MODESE - ST. LouIs], available at http://dese.mo.gov/planning/
profile/ SF1 15115.html.
2. The 2009 average attendance in the Clayton district was approximately
2,365. MODESE ANNUAL REPORT OF SCHOOL DATA - CLAYTON FINANCE REPORT
2006-2010, Mo. DEP'T OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC. (Dec. 7, 2010) [here-
inafter MODESE - CLAYTON], available at http://dese.mo.gov/planning /profile/ SFO
96102.html.
3. Turner v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton, 318 S.W.3d 660 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (per
curiam).
4. Id. at 662; see Mo. REV. STAT. § 167.131 (2000).
5. Turner, 318 S.W.3d at 669.
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tion of section 167.131 removes any discretion that the district may have had
6in accepting the transfer child. Ultimately, the accredited district is forced to
accept any student who transfers from an unaccredited district.
Turner's impact on the accredited school districts of both the St. Louis
metro area and the State of Missouri as a whole is severe, harsh, and unex-
pected.7 Both the surrounding accredited districts and parents of students in
unaccredited districts are frustrated with the lack of clarification as to what
the ruling actually means and how it will be put into practice.8 The practical
results of the majority's interpretation will have major impacts on the areas of
funding, transportation, and safety, to name a few.9 The court's holding in
Turner - that accredited districts must accept students from adjoining unac-
credited districts - was a reading of the plain meaning of the language of the
statue.1o That reading has opened the door for a multitude of consequences
which could not possibly have been intended by the legislature, indicating a
need for the legislature to review and reassess the language of section
167.131.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Jane Turner, Susan Bruker, Gina Breitenfeld, and William Drendel were
parents of school age children who lived within the City of St. Louis and
within the borders of the transitional school district." The parents all shared
in the decision to send their children to schools in the Clayton School District
in St. Louis County, which adjoins the City of St. Louis. 12 The children at-
tended schools in Clayton under personal tuition agreements, which their
parents negotiated with Clayton for the 2007-2008 school year prior to the St.
Louis Public School District's June 2007 loss of accreditation.' 3
After the loss of accreditation, one of the parents requested that Clayton
bill the Transitional School District for the 2007-2008 tuition pursuant to
14
section 167.131. Clayton chose not to request payment from the transitional
6. Idn
7. See infra Parts V.A-C.
8. See infra Part V.D.
9. See infra Parts V.A-B,E.
10. See Turner, 318 S.W.3d at 669.
11. Id. at 663. The Transitional School District is the name given to the school
district of the City of St. Louis, which lost its status as an accredited school district
through the State of Missouri in 2007. Bd. of Educ. of the City of St. Louis v. Mo.
State Bd. of Educ., 271 S.W.3d 1, 5-6 (Mo. 2008) (en banc).
12. Turner, 318 S.W.3d at 663; see About Clayton, CITY OF CLAYTON, MISSOURI,
http://www.claytonmo.gov/Visitor/About-Clayton.htm (last visited May 30, 2011).
13. Turner, 318 S.W.3d at 663.
14. Id. Mo. REv. STAT. § 167.131 is titled "District Not Accredited Shall Pay
Tuition and Transportation When - Amount Charged" and states:
942 [Vol. 76
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 76, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 14
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol76/iss3/14
RSMO 167.131 & UNCONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE
school district, and the parents filed suit against Clayton, the transitional
school district, and the Board of Education for the City of St. Louis.15
The parents sought a declaratory judgment that the Transitional School
District was responsible for the payment of their children's tuition to Clayton
because the Transitional School District was no longer accredited by the State
of Missouri. In their separate motions to dismiss or in the alternative mo-
tions for summary judgment, Clayton and the Transitional School District
argued that section 167.131 did not apply to the instant situation. Clayton
asserted that the Safe Schools Act gave the district discretion as to which
non-resident students it would admit from unaccredited school districts. 18
Furthermore, Clayton argued that because it had not admitted the children
pursuant to section 167.131, the parents' claims were foreclosed. 19
The St. Louis Circuit Court determined that section 167.131 was not ap-
plicable to the parents' situation and that there was "no legal basis" for the
parents' request for declaratory judgment. 20 The court then entered final
1. The board of education of each district in this state that does not main-
tain an accredited school pursuant to the authority of the state board of
education to classify schools as established in section 161.092, RSMo,
shall pay the tuition of and provide transportation consistent with the pro-
visions of section 167.241, RSMo, for each pupil resident therein who at-
tends an accredited school in another district of the same or an adjoining
county.
2. The rate of tuition to be charged by the district attended and paid by the
sending district is the per pupil cost of maintaining the district's grade lev-
el grouping which includes the school attended. The cost of maintaining a
grade level grouping shall be determined by the board of education of the
district but in no case shall it exceed all amounts spent for teachers' wag-
es, incidental purposes, debt service, maintenance and replacements. The
term "debt service", as used in this section, means expenditures for the re-
tirement of bonded indebtedness and expenditures for interest on bonded
indebtedness. Per pupil cost of the grade level grouping shall be deter-
mined by dividing the cost of maintaining the grade level grouping by the
average daily pupil attendance. If there is disagreement as to the amount
of tuition to be paid, the facts shall be submitted to the state board of edu-
cation, and its decision in the matter shall be final. Subject to the limita-
tions of this section, each pupil shall be free to attend the public school of
his or her choice.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 167.131 (2000).
15. Turner, 318 S.W.3d at 663.
16. Id. The parents' petition was later amended with a request for restitution for




20. Turner v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton, No. ED92226, 2009 Mo. App. LEXIS 885,
at *4 (Mo. App. E.D. June 23, 2009), supersededby Turner, 318 S.W.3d 660.
2011] 943
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judgment in favor of Clayton and the transitional school district, from which
the parents appealed.21 The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern Dis-
trict determined that section 167.131 was not relevant to the situation because
the parents were contractually obligated to pay the tuition under the agree-
ment they had signed with Clayton, precluding any other party from doing
so.22 The court of appeals determined that it would affirm the judgment of
the trial court, but due to the significance of the issues involved, it chose to
transfer the case to the Supreme Court of Missouri.23
Upon its review, the Supreme Court of Missouri determined that section
167.131 did apply to the factual situation of the parents.24 The court found
that under the plain meaning of section 167.131 the parents were entitled to
have the Clayton tuition paid by the transitional school district.25 The court
further clarified that despite the Safe Schools Act, section 167.131 did not
grant the accredited school districts any discretion as to which students they
would admit.26
1II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
While all Missouri children are entitled to a free public education, his-
torically they have not been able to choose at will where that public education
will take place.27 With the passage of the Missouri Safe Schools Act and
section 167.020, the Missouri legislature sought to provide a safe learning
environment for children through procedures which govern the acceptance of
28
students transferring from one public school to another. Other transfer re-
strictions on students of St. Louis City public schools have been put into
place as a result of the settlement of Liddell v. Board of Education, a desegre-
gation lawsuit. 29 After the St. Louis Public School District's most recent loss
of accreditation in 2007, the desire of students to transfer to accredited
schools outside of the district under section 167.131 has emerged, culminat-
ing in the Supreme Court of Missouri's Turner decision. 30 In order to reach
21. Id. at *13.
22. Id.
23. Id. at *14.
24. There was no dispute that the St. Louis Public School District was without
accreditation from the Missouri State Board of Education (State Board) and the par-
ents and children lived in the City of St. Louis but had chosen to attend a school in an
adjoining county that was accredited by the State Board. Turner, 318 S.W.3d at 665.
25. Id. The court declined to follow the argument of the Transitional School
District that section 167.131 was only meant to apply in a situation when individual
schools lost accreditation, not to an entire "district-wide loss of accreditation." Id.
26. Id. at 668-69.
27. See infra Part III.B.
28. See infra Part Ill.A.
29. See infra Part Ill.
30. See infra Parts Ill.D-E.
944 [Vol. 76
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their respective determinations on the meaning and interpretation of section
167.131, both the majority and the dissent employed multiple methods of
statutory interpretation.
A. The Safe Schools Act and Missouri Revised Statues Section 167.020
Following an onslaught of violence in American high schools and more
specifically the death of a high school freshman in Missouri,32 the Missouri
legislature chose to enact the Safe Schools Act in 1996 in an effort "to ensure
that Missouri's public schools are a safe place for students to learn and
achieve." 33 Under the Act, students wishing to transfer to a different public
school within the same district or in another district are required to prove
residency within the district or request and obtain a waiver of the residency
requirement.34 By waiving the residency requirement, section 167.020 allows
students who can demonstrate hardship or good cause to transfer to a nearby
accredited district.35 If there is any reason to suspect that the transferring
student would cause an immediate danger to other students or faculty at the
new school, the superintendent may conduct a hearing within five days of the
36
registration request to determine whether to accept the student.
If the transferring student requests a waiver of any of the requirements
of section 167.020.2, the district board of the new school shall hold a hearing
as soon as possible but not more than forty-five days after the request for
waiver was made, or the waiver will be granted by default.37 The board has
the discretion to approve or reject the waiver request.3 If the waiver is ap-
31. See infra Part I1I.F.
32. On January 24, 1995, Christine Smetzer, a freshman at McCluer North High
School in St. Louis, was brutally raped and murdered in one of the bathrooms of the
school while taking a restroom break from class. Cathi M. Kraetzer, Law Summary,
Does the Missouri Safe Schools Act Pass the Test? Expelling Disruptive Students to
Keep Missouri's Schools Safe, 67 Mo. L. REv. 123, 126 (2002); see Stanley Matthew
Burgess, Comment, Missouri's Safe Schools Act: An Attempt to Ensure a Safe Educa-
tion Opportunity, 66 UMKC L. REV. 603, 603 (1998). Christine did not know the
student who murdered her; he had just transferred to McCluer North the day before.
Burgess, supra, at 603. He had been arrested at his prior high school after being
found in the women's restroom, but McCluer North failed to verify any permanent
records from his prior high school, thus allowing a disturbed young man entry into
what should have been a safe place for Christine. Id.
33. Burgess, supra note 32, at 603-04. The Safe Schools Act encompasses nu-
merous statutes including Mo. REV. STAT. § 167.020. See Susan Anderson, The Safe
Schools Act Protects Missouri Students, 55 J. Mo. B. 264, 264-65 (1999).
34. Mo. REV. STAT. § 167.020.2(1)-(2) (Supp. 2010).
35. Id. § 167.020.3.
36. Id. § 167.020.2(2).
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proved, the transferring student may register.39 If the waiver is rejected, the
student has the opportunity to appeal the decision to the circuit court of the
district's county.40
Within two business days of a student's enrollment at a new school, the
school official who enrolled the student must request records from the previ-
ous school.41 The school official must also request the disciplinary records of
the transferring student from all schools that the transferring student attended
in the previous twelve months, as required by section 106.261.9.42 The stu-
dent's previous schools must respond to the request for disciplinary records
within five days of its receipt. 43
B. The Right to a Free Public Education
The Missouri Constitution entitles anyone under the age of twenty-one
to a free public education, stating that:
A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential
to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the gen-
eral assembly shall establish and maintain free public schools for
the gratuitous instruction of all persons in this state within ages not
in excess of twenty-one years as prescribed by law.4
39. See id.
40. Id. Section 167.020.4 also provides that anyone who knowingly submits
false information in regards to subsection 2 of the statute is guilty of a misdemeanor,
whereas section 2 pertains to the transferring student as a potential dangerous threat to
students and teachers at the new school. Id. § 167.020.2-.4.
41. Id. § 167.020.7.
42. Id. Section 160.261.9 states:
Each school board shall define in its discipline policy acts of violence and
any other acts that constitute a serious violation of that policy. "Acts of
violence" as defined by school boards shall include but not be limited to
exertion of physical force by a student with the intent to do serious bodily
harm to another person while on school property, including a school bus
in service on behalf of the district, or while involved in school activities.
School districts shall for each student enrolled in the school district com-
pile and maintain records of any serious violation of the district's disci-
pline policy. Such records shall be made available to teachers and other
school district employees with a need to know while acting within the
scope of their assigned duties, and shall be provided as required in section
167.020, RSMo, to any school district in which the student subsequently
attempts to enroll.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 160.261.9 (Supp. 2010).
43. Mo. REV. STAT. § 167.020.7.
44. MO. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a).
946 [Vol. 76
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While all persons under the age of twenty-one may be entitled to a free
public education, that does not mean that the education can take place at the
student's school of choice.45 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Missouri decided just such an issue in Washington v. Ladue School District
Board of Education.46 In Washington, a student who presumably did not
meet the residency requirements of section 167.020 was removed from a
classroom and dropped from the district rolls.47 The student claimed that this
action violated his civil rights and requested a temporary restraining order
48
and preliminary injunction. Upon reviewing the facts of the case, the court
held that while "every child is indeed entitled to a free public education, no-
where in the Constitution nor in any statute of the State of Missouri is a child
entitled to choose, at whim, the location of that education." The court noted
that a specific purpose of section 167.020 was to determine which school
children are to attend.5 0 The court also enunciated the potential problems
with granting a preliminary restraining order or injunction and the issues that
would be created by allowing children to choose which public schools they
would attend.
The court was concerned that a temporary restraining order or prelimi-
nary injunction against the district would create a massive influx of applica-
tions to attend school within the district based on the "dubious grounds" of
previously living in the district or possibly moving there in the future.52 If
students could choose their school without residency restrictions, "the struc-
ture of the public school system of the State would collapse into chaos, there-
by resulting in an actual deprivation of the right to a free public education." 53
The court reasoned that many schools, like those in the Ladue district, would
not be able to accommodate the sheer volume of students who wished to at-
tend, while other schools would likely be unable to continue to function due
to a reduction in attendance.5 4 The court made it clear that the right to free
public education is a fundamental right of the children of the United States
45. Washington v. Ladue Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1058
(E.D. Mo. 2008).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1056. The court was unable to definitively state where the plaintiff
lived because his counsel avoided answering that question. Id. at 1058 n.4.
48. Id. at 1055-56.
49. Id. at 1058.
50. Id. The court also stated that it was confident that the plaintiff would be
readmitted to the Ladue School District if he were able to prove his residency within
the district; however, he was unable to do that. Id. at n.5.
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and Missouri; however, the school where that education takes place is re-
stricted by section 167.020 and in turn by the student's residency.
C. Senate Bill 781 and Missouri Revised Statutes Sections 162.1060
and 162.1100
As an essential part of negotiating the settlement of desegregation
claims in Missouri in the late 1990s, Senate Bill 781 ("SB 781") was ap-
proved by the Missouri legislature and signed by Governor Mel Carnahan in
561996. SB 781 allocated conditional funding to the St. Louis Public School
District so long as the federal district court entered a final judgment on the
desegregation settlement by March 15, 1999.57 The bill also required that St.
Louis voters approve a sales or property tax increase to provide $20 million
for the school district.58 Both conditions were met, and portions of SB 781
were codified as sections 162.1060 and 162.1 100.5
Section 162.1060 created the "Metropolitan Schools Achieving Value in
Transfer Corporation" to execute the urban voluntary school transfer program
to the City of St. Louis. 0 Under the urban voluntary school transfer program,
eligible black students who lived in the city could choose to transfer to
schools in St. Louis County, and white students from St. Louis County could
choose to transfer to city magnet schools.6 1 The corporation's board of direc-
tors was responsible for the transportation of the voluntary transfer students
as well as the payment of the students' tuition to the schools that they were
attending.62 To enter the voluntary transfer program, students would need to
meet criteria designated by the board of directors, with preference given to
those students already participating in a transfer program.63 State aid for the
students who participated in the transfer program would be paid to the trans-
fer corporation.64 The transfer corporation would then distribute the aid to
the school district where the student attends classes, not the district where the
student resided.
55. Id.
56. Justin D. Smith, Note, Hostile Takeover: The State of Missouri, the St. Louis
School District, and the Struggle for Quality Education in the Inner-City, 74 Mo. L.
REV. 1143, 1153-54 (2009).
57. Id. at 1154.
58. Id.
59. See S.B. 781, 89th Gen. Assem., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1998).
60. MO. REV. STAT. § 162.1060.1 (2000).
61. Turner v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton, 318 S.W.3d 660, 666 (Mo. 2010) (en banc)
(per curiam).
62. MO. REV. STAT. § 162.1060.2(1).
63. Id.
64. Id. § 162.1060.3(1)-(2).
65. Id. § 162.1060.3(2).
948 [Vol. 76
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While section 162.1060 focuses on the voluntary transfer of students
from urban to suburban areas, section 162.1100 establishes a transitional
school district for the City of St. Louis in the event that the district loses its
accreditation from the State Board. A chief executive office will be ap-
pointed and "any powers granted to any existing school board . . . shall be
vested with the special administrative board of the Transitional School Dis-
trict. . .. "6 Termination of a transitional school district can be made at any
time by the State Board68 so long as the Board determines that the purposes
for which a transitional school district was established have been met. 69 The
State Board can also reestablish a transitional school district at any time upon
a determination that "it is necessary . . . to accomplish the purposes estab-
lished in this section."70 Upon a decision by the State Board to terminate or
reestablish the transitional school district, the board must provide notice to
the governor and general assembly and the decision shall go into effect thirty
days later. 1 The Transitional School District for the City of St. Louis was
most recently reestablished in 2007 after the St. Louis Public School District
lost accreditation.7 2
D. St. Louis Public School District's Current Loss ofAccreditation
Since 1994, the St. Louis Public School District has failed to achieve
anything more than minimally acceptable performance levels.73 After the
July 2006 resignation of yet another superintendent, 74 the Missouri Commis-
sioner of Education stepped in and appointed an Advisory Committee "to
advise him, the [S]tate [B]oard, and the community" about the problems fac-
66. Mo. REV. STAT. § 162.1100 (Supp. 2010).
67. Id. § 162.1100.3.
68. Mo. REV. STAT. § 161.092(9) (2000). The Board uses minimum standards
for high school graduation, curriculum, student testing, support services, and other
areas as laid out in the Missouri School Improvement Program to determine accredita-
tion of school districts. Facts About the Missouri State Board of Education, Mo.
DEP'T OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUc., http://dese.mo.gov/stateboard
/stateboard.html (last updated Apr. 11, 2011). The standards are divided into three
main categories: Resource Standards, Process Standards, and Performance Standards,
with further subcategories in each. See MO. DEP'T OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY
EDUC., STANDARDS AND INDICATORS MANUAL 4 (July 1, 2006), available at http://
dese.mo.gov/divimprove/sia/msip/Fourth%20Cycle%2OStandards%20and%20Indicat
ors.pdf,
69. MO. REV. STAT. § 162.1100.12.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Bd. of Educ. of the City of St. Louis v. Mo. State Bd. of Educ., 271 S.W.3d
1, 6 (Mo. 2008) (en banc).
73. Id. at 5.
74. This was the fifth resignation in three years. Smith, supra note 56, at 1145.
9492011]
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ing the St. Louis Public School District.75 The Advisory Committee reviewed
a number of issues including school district performance, financial status,
concerns of parents, and the 1999 desegregation agreement, issuing a final
report in December 2006.7
Following the report, the State Board chose to follow the recommenda-
tion of the Advisory Committee and reestablished the Transitional School
District in February 2007. 7 One month later, the State Board met to consider
the issue of accreditation.78 In that meeting, the State Board considered the
Advisory Committee report as well as financial, performance, and accredita-
tion information about the district.79 The Department of Elementary and Sec-
ondary Education provided its evaluation of the district as well as supporting
documentation for its determination that the State Board should unaccredit
the district.so The loss of accreditation became official on June 15, 2007, and
the Special Administrative Board of the Transitional School District took
over.81 The city board challenged the determination on multiple grounds but
was unsuccessful. 82 The St. Louis Public School District remains unaccredit-
ed today, and the Special Administrative Board of the Transitional School
District remains in power.83
E. Missouri Revised Statutes Section 167.131
Section 167.131 outlines the tuition payment guidelines for a transfer
student from an unaccredited school district, as well as the mode of ac-
ceptance of that transfer student at another public school.84 When a school
district fails to maintain an accredited school as established by the State
Board in section 161.092, that district is required to pay the tuition of the
transferring student.85 The failing district must also provide transportation for
transferring students so long as they attend an accredited school in another
75. Bd. ofEduc., 271 S.W.3d at 6.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. In order to remain accredited, a school district must meet standards set by
the State Board. Mo. REV. STAT. § 161.092(9) (Supp. 2010).
79. Bd. ofEduc., 271 S.W.3d at 6.
80. Id.
8 1. Id.
82. Id. at 6, 18.
83. See Virginia Young, Senate Debate Affects 72,000 Students Here, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 24, 2011, at A2, available at http://www.stltoday.
com/news/local/education/article_394bld24-8570-5cac-8a74-77ed35311252.html
(discussing recent meetings with the special administrative board that is running the
St. Louis Public School District).
84. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 167.131 (2000).
85. Id. § 167.131.1.
950 [Vol. 76
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district in the same or a bordering county.86 Tuition is charged to the unac-
credited district for the "per pupil cost of maintaining the district's grade level
grouping."87
The most controversial part of section 167.131 pertains to the last line of
subparagraph 2, which states that "[s]ubject to the limitations of this section,
each pupil shall be free to attend the public school of his or her choice."88
Section 167.151 gives the school board discretion to accept students who are
not entitled to a free education within the district.89 Section 167.131 seems to
carve out an exception to section 167.151 by allowing students to transfer
from unaccredited districts to the accredited district of their choice. It is dif-
ficult to contemplate that the legislature intended for some students not enti-
tled to a free education within a district to be able to transfer to the school of
their choice while others are not allowed that luxury.
F. Statutory Interpretation
When there are discrepancies as to the meaning of a statute, courts may
employ a number of different construction principles to determine the inten-
tions of the legislature. In most cases, the problem is not which principle of
interpretation is applicable but which principle to apply.90 The cardinal rule
when interpreting a statute is to determine the intention of the legislature from
the plain and ordinary meaning of the words of the statute.9 1
If two statutes seem at odds, both are enforced even if they are not in
complete agreement.92 Statutes which are not at odds on their face but seem
to conflict when read together must be harmonized if possible and both given
effect.93 When interpreting statutes, courts assume that the legislature knows
the law, 94 which prohibits courts from reading language into statutes. 95
Courts also make the presumption that the legislature intended to give mean-
ing to every word of the statute and that no language in the statute is excess or
86. Id.
87. Id. § 167.131.2.
88. Id
89. Mo. REV. STAT. § 167.151.1 (Supp. 2010).
90. Craig A. Sullivan, Statutory Construction in Missouri, 59 J. Mo. B. 120, 121
(2003).
91. State ex rel. Unnerstall v. Berkemeyer, 298 S.W.3d 513, 519 (Mo. 2009) (en
banc).
92. StopAquila.org v. City of Peculiar, 208 S.W.3d 895, 905 (Mo. 2006) (en
banc).
93. S. Metro. Fire Prot. Dist. v. City of Lee's Summit, 278 S.W.3d 659, 666
(Mo. 2009) (en banc).
94. State ex rel. Broadway-Washington Assocs., Ltd. v. Manners, 186 S.W.3d
272, 275 (Mo. 2006) (en banc).
95. State ex rel. Mercantile Nat. Bank at Dallas v. Rooney, 402 S.W.2d 354, 362
(Mo. 1966) (en banc).
9512011]
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superfluous.96 Generally, the use of the word "may" within a statute is per-
missive, while the use of the word "shall" mandates an action.97
Still another canon of statutory interpretation is that of reductio ad ab-
surdum, meaning that the logical consequence of an argument should not be
an absurd one.98 Courts also employ the canon of expresio unius est exclusio
alterius, "the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of anoth-
er." 99 Finally, when interpreting a statute, courts give great weight to the
interpretation and construction given to the statute by the agency that enforc-
es it.'" While courts may use any or all of these methods of interpretation,
they must always keep in mind the purpose of determining the intent of the
legislature in enacting the statute. 01
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Turner v. School District of Clayton, the Supreme Court of Missouri
reversed the decision of the St. Louis County Circuit Court in its interpreta-
tion of Missouri Revised Statutes section 167.131 and remanded the case.102
In an opinion drafted by Chief Justice William Ray Price, all of the judges
agreed that section 167.131 requires the Transitional School District to pay
the tuition of students who choose to attend an accredited school in an adjoin-
ing district. 103 The judges were also in agreement that the parents of those
students are required to pay the tuition for the time period covered by negoti-
ated tuition agreements.'0 The dissent, drafted by Judge Patricia Brecken-
ridge and joined by Judge Mary Rhodes Russell and Judge Laura Denvir
Stith, departed from the majority on the issue of whether the district to which
the student chooses to transfer has any discretion in accepting the student.105
96. Hyde Park Hous. P'ship v. Dir. of Revenue, 850 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Mo. 1993)
(en banc).
97. State ex inf McKittrick v. Wymore, 119 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Mo. 1938) (en
banc).
98. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1392 (9th ed. 2009).
99. See Harrison v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 607 S.W.2d 137, 146 (Mo. 1980) (en
banc); Sullivan, supra note 90, at 122.
100. Linton v. Mo. Veterinary Med. Bd., 988 S.W.2d 513, 517 (Mo. 1999) (en
banc).
101. See Sullivan, supra note 90, at 120.
102. Turner v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton, 318 S.W.3d 660, 670 (Mo. 2010) (en banc)
(per curiam).
103. Id. at 663.
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A. The Majority Opinion
On appeal from the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of the defendants, the parents and children claimed that the plain language of
section 167.131 required that the unaccredited Transitional School District
pay the tuition of students who were attending accredited schools in Clayton
under negotiated tuition agreements.' The standard of review for the grant
of a motion for summary judgment is de novo.107
The parents first claimed that the circuit court erred in granting sum-
mary judgment in favor of the Transitional School District because the plain
language of section 167.131 clearly applies to the transitional school dis-
trict.10  The parents also maintained that the transitional district should be
required to pay the tuition of their children.1 09 The parents argued that sec-
tion 167.131 applies to them because the Transitional School District was
unaccredited, the children and parents lived in the City of St. Louis, and the
children attended schools in another accredited school district.' 0
The Transitional School District argued that section 167.131 applies on-
ly in situations where a single school loses accreditation, not an entire district,
basing its claim on the legislative history of the statute."' The Transitional
School District also argued that section 167.131 should not apply because
some of its schools were accredited by a private organization.112
The court dismissed both of the district's arguments and stated that if the
intent of the legislature could be obtained from the plain meaning of the stat-
ute, then it was unnecessary to consider legislative history." 3  Regarding
accreditation by a private organization, the court determined that section
167.131 applies to districts that maintain unaccredited schools under the State
Board's authority.114
The parents next asserted there was no conflict between the language of
section 167.131 and SB 781." The parents also claimed that the circuit
106. Id. at 663 (majority opinion).
107. Id. at 664 (citing ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply
Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. 1993) (en banc)).
108. Id.
109. Id. See supra note 14 for the languate of Section 167.131.





115. Id. at 665-66. Section 167.131 allows students of unaccredited districts to
transfer to accredited districts, while SB 781 governs the transfer of students from the
St. Louis Public School District to schools in St. Louis County in accordance with the
settlement of the St. Louis desegregation case. Id. Sections 162.1060 and 162.1100
codified portions of SB 781. Id. at 666 n.4. Section 162.1060 establishes the "urban
voluntary school transfer program" to aid in the desegregation of St. Louis City
2011] 953
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court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis of a conflict between
the two.116 The district argued in response that the funding provisions of
section 167.131117 were in conflict with section 162.106018 and that section
167.131 undercut the purpose of section 162.1060 by taking students away
from the voluntary desegregation program."19 In regard to section 162.1100,
the district claimed that if section 167.131 were applied to the City of St.
Louis, many students would choose to attend county schools, resulting in
decreased funding for the city. 120
The court noted that the districts failed to provide any evidence that SB
781 was meant to exclude the St. Louis Public School District from section
167.131, as the language of the statute did not demonstrate an exemption. 121
There were no "textual inconsistencies" between the statutes that would pre-
vent them from being enforced together.122 The court determined that section
167.131 was not repealed by implication for the St. Louis Public School Dis-
trict, reasoning that even if tension exists between two statutes, both are en-
forceable unless "irreconcilably inconsistent."l 23 According to the court, the
minimal tension existing between SB 781 and section 167.131 only made it
slightly more difficult to apply SB 781.124 Also, the court found that the leg-
islature had the power to specifically exclude the Transitional School District
from section 167.131 and did not do so.125 Additionally, the court stated that
it only had the power to "enforce the law as it is written" resulting in a con-
current application of section 167.131 and SB 781.126
Clayton argued that it was not required to admit students transferring
under section 167.131 because section 167.020 gave it discretion to choose
which students to admit and reject.127 The court reasoned that the meaning of
schools. Id. at 666. Section 162.1100 outlines the process for takeover of St. Louis
City schools after a loss of accreditation. Id. at 667.
116. Id. at 665-66.
117. Section 167.131 requires the unaccredited district to pay the cost of attend-
ance for students who chose to transfer. Mo. REV. STAT. § 167.131.1 (2000).
118. Section 162.1060 states that the cost of attendance for students attending
other schools under the urban voluntary transfer program are to be paid by the corpo-
ration that oversees the program. Mo. REV. STAT. § 162.1060.2(1) (2000).
119. Turner, 318 S.W.3d at 666-67.





125. Id. at 668.
126. Id.
127. Id. The pertinent language of 167.131 states that "each pupil shall be free to
attend the public school of his or her choice." Mo. REV. STAT. § 167.131.2 (2000).
Section 167.020 requires a waiver of the residence requirement in order to admit a
student not living in the school district. Mo. REV. STAT. § 167.020.2(2) (Supp. 2010).
[Vol. 76954
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section 167.131 was plain on its face and did not require the aid of statutory
interpretation, hence a reading of section 167.131 in pari materia was unnec-
essary.128 According to the court, the clear language of section 167.131 elim-
inated the need for its harmonization with section 167.020.129 The court stat-
ed that the legislature's use of "shall" instead of "may" in section 167.131 -
referring to a student's choice to transfer to an accredited school - demon-
strated the clear intent to require school districts like Clayton to accept stu-
dents transferring from unaccredited school districts.' 30 Based on the plain
and ordinary language of "shall" and not "may" in section 167.131, the court
held that an accredited school in another or adjoining district was required to
admit a student transferring from an unaccredited school.
Finally, the court examined the parents' claim that the Transitional
School District should be responsible for the payment of the prior tuition
under the tuition agreements that the parents negotiated directly with Clay-
ton.132 The court rejected the parents' claims that the tuition agreements were
not supported by consideration.' 33 In making the tuition agreements, the par-
ents bargained for a Clayton education in return for tuition, which is exactly
what they received.134 According to the court, the tuition agreement included
no provision that eliminated the obligation of the parents to pay Clayton if the
city school district lost its accreditation.135 The court determined that Clayton
was not required to obtain payment from the Transitional School District for
the period of time after the St. Louis Public School District was unaccredited,
because the tuition agreement still governed. The court also found that the
parents were not entitled to restitution for the tuition paid in prior years, as it
was outside of the scope of the tuition agreements signed by the parents.' 37
The court found that because the school district where the students re-
sided was unaccredited, section 167.131 allowed the students to attend an
accredited school of an adjoining district, with the tuition to be paid by the
unaccredited school district.138 Finally, the court determined that section
167.131 provided that the accredited district to which the students of unac-
credited districts choose to transfer has no discretion and must accept the
transfer students. 3 9
128. Turner, 318 S.W.3d at 668.
129. Id. at 668-69.
130. See id. at 668-69.
131. Id. at 669.
132. Id. at 669-70.




137. Id. at 669-70.
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B. The Dissent
The dissent disagreed with the majority's conclusion that section
167.131 does not give Clayton discretion in admitting students transferring
from an unaccredited school in an adjoining county.140 The crux of the dis-
sent's position was that the majority's plain-meaning interpretation of section
167.131 brought it into conflict with section 167.020, which requires the
court to "attempt to harmonize them."'41
The dissent reasoned that section 167.020 was enacted in 1996 as a part
of the Safe Schools Act.142 According to the dissent, the Safe Schools Act
described situations in which schools were required to accept transfer stu-
dents versus when the schools were allowed discretion.143 The dissent con-
cluded that in order to transfer to a new school, students were required to
either prove that they resided within the school district or obtain a waiver of
the residency requirement.'" The dissent noted that the pertinent language of
section 167.020 stated that the district "may grant the request for a waiver of
any requirement of subsection 2" or "may also reject the request for a waiver
in which case the pupil shall not be allowed to register."1 4 5 The dissent de-
termined that the legislature's use of "may" instead of "shall" demonstrated
that the district was not required to grant a waiver of the residency require-
ment to a transferring student.146 According to the dissent, this discretion was
limited, as the student denied a waiver could turn to the courts for judicial
review of the denial.147
Under the dissent's interpretation, students attending a public school at
the discretion of the accepting district in return for tuition pursuant to either
section 167.121, a transportation hardship, or section 167.151 were expressly
excluded from the residency waiver requirement of section 167.020.148 Be-
cause section 167.131 and its guidelines for students of unaccredited districts
were not mentioned in section 167.020.6, the dissent concluded that students
enrolling under section 167.131 were not to be excluded from the require-
ments of section 167.020 and were required to apply to the board for a waiver
of the residency requirement. 149 The dissent's interpretation provided that
140. Id. at 670 (Breckenridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
141. Id. at 671 (quoting S. Metro. Fire Prot. Dist. v. City of Lee's Summit, 278
S.W.3d 659, 666 (Mo. 2009) (en banc)).
142. Id.
143. Id.; see MO. REV. STAT. § 167.020.2-.3 (Supp. 2010).
144. Mo. REV. STAT. § 167.020.2.
145. Turner, 318 S.W.3d at 672 (Breckenridge, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
146. Id.
147. Mo. REV. STAT. § 167.020.3.
148. Id. § 167.020.6.
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students intending to transfer to accredited schools in an adjoining district
must obtain a residency waiver as required under section 167.020.3."so The
dissent noted that the majority's interpretation of section 167.131 was in con-
flict with the above plain reading of section 167.020, thus requiring the two
statutes to be harmonized.'
In harmonizing the two statutes, the dissent focused upon the last sen-
tence of section 167.131.2, which states that "[s]ubject to the limitations of
this section, each pupil shall be free to attend the public school of his or her
choice." 52 When the dissent gave effect to every word in the sentence, it
concluded that the majority failed to focus on "the limitations of [the] sec-
tion." 53 The dissent found a limitation in 167.131.1 that required the trans-
ferring student to "attend" an accredited school in another district in order for
that student's tuition to be paid by the unaccredited district.1 54 The dissent
stressed that when read in its entirety, section 167.131 stated that "while each
pupil is free to choose the school the pupil desires to attend, that choice is
limited by the requirement that the pupil be admitted to and attend the school
of the pupil's choice."' 55 The dissent's reading then required consideration of
section 167.020 because it set forth the requirements for admission of nonres-
idents.156 When the dissent harmonized section 167.131 with section
167.020, it was clear that a student was free to attend the school of his or her
choice only after being admitted to that school at the school's discretion
through the waiver process.' 57 Because section 167.131 can be read in har-
mony with section 167.020, the dissent found that the majority misplaced its
reliance on section 167.131 as the more specific statute.' 58
The dissent said its interpretation also correlated with interpretations by
the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE).15 9  The
dissent stressed that because DESE is the "agency charged with administering
the educational laws of [Missouri] that pertain to elementary and secondary
education," its interpretation of section 167.131 is given "great weight."' 60
150. Id. at 673.
151. Id.
152. Id.; see Mo. REV. STAT. § 167.131.2 (2000).





157. Id. at 673-74.
158. "The rule of construction that a more specific statute governs over a more
general statute to the extent of any inconsistency between the two . . . traditionally
applies only in situations in which the two statutory provisions being construed can-
not be harmonized." Id at 674.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 674-75. "The interpretation and construction of a statute by an agency
charged with its administration is entitled to great weight." Linton v. Mo. Veterinary
9572011]1
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DESE interpreted section 167.131 to mean "[a]ccredited districts . . . may
accept or reject transfer pupils from an unaccredited district," which was
clearly in line with the interpretation of the dissent.
Finally, the dissent focused on the "absurd" consequences that would re-
sult from the majority's interpretation of section 167.131.162 Under the ma-
jority's interpretation, the accredited districts are required to accept the trans-
fer students. The majority's interpretation creates the possibility that the
entire St. Louis Public School District could transfer to Clayton, and there
would be no means to stop this influx.16 The dissent noted that it was absurd
to think that the legislature intended for this kind of influx from unaccredited
school districts when there was no way that the districts to which these stu-
dents transfer would be able to accommodate enormous increases in their
student body.165 The dissent went on to describe population statistics that
aided in this conclusion.' 6 6 After harmonizing sections 167.131 and 167.020,
noting the specific exclusion of section 167.131 from section 167.020, and
emphasizing the absurd consequences of the majority's reading of section
167.131, the dissent stated that it would affirm the trial court judgment and
not require Clayton to admit the students.167
V. COMMENT
The St. Louis Public School District is the largest in the state, with aver-
age enrollment for 2009 of over 23,000 students.' Based on the majority's
interpretation of section 167.131 in Turner, all 23,000 of those children can
choose to transfer to the accredited school district of their choice in an adjoin-
ing county. The districts to which the students transfer have no discretion in
choosing whether to admit the transfer students. Considering the wide range
of significant impacts that the majority's interpretation of section 167.131
will have on school districts in the St. Louis area and State of Missouri as a
whole, the fairly short discussion of requiring Clayton to admit transfer stu-
dents from unaccredited districts seems inadequate.169 The majority's almost
tunnel-vision focus on the plain language of section 167.131 precludes any
other possible reading of section 167.131 and fails to thoroughly consider the
Med. Bd., 988 S.W.2d 513, 517 (Mo. 1999) (en banc) (quoting Foremost-McKesson,
Inc. v. Davis, 488 S.W.2d 193, 197 (Mo. 1972) (en banc)).
161. Turner, 318 S.W.3d at 674 (Breckenridge, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).





167. Id. at 676.
168. See MODESE - ST. Louis, supra note 1.
169. See Turner, 318 S.W.3d at 668-70.
958 [Vol. 76
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practical results that will come from the decision. In contrast, the dissent
thoroughly discusses section 167.131 in its entirety and harmonizes it with
section 167.020, while demonstrating the absurd consequences resulting from
the majority's interpretation. 170
A focus on these absurd consequences fuels the discussion of the dis-
sent. It would be nearly impossible to adequately describe all of the implica-
tions of the majority's decision, but the most significant seem to be in the
areas of school funding, transportation, capacity, enforcement, safety, and the
right to a free public education. This section addresses these consequences in
turn. As a result of the court's decision, the legislature should make changes
to section 167.131 considering the level of uncertainty in the school districts
where transitional district students may transfer.171
A. School Funding
The unaccredited districts will have to contend with the major problem
of funding the transfers. Under the court's holding, the unaccredited district
is required to pay tuition to the accredited district attended by the student.172
While the entire court agreed on this point, 73 the severity of its impact is
abundantly clear when viewed in light of the majority's interpretation that
transfer schools have no discretion in admissions. Tuition is more expensive
for a transfer student from an unaccredited district than that for a transfer
student under other conditions.' 74 If transfer students from unaccredited dis-
tricts can transfer to the school of their choosing, it is likely that many will
take advantage of that opportunity, putting the Transitional School District on
the hook for a potentially astronomical tuition bill.175 This leads to a question
of how the transitional district would ever be able to cover the costs of the
tuition payments to other schools and manage to regain its accreditation as its
funding decreases and costs increase.176
170. See id. at 676 (Breckenridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
171. See Allison Retka, Tuition Decision by Missouri Supreme Court Raises
Questions, MiSSOURI LAWYERS MEDIA, July 25, 2010, available at http:/
/findarticles.com/p/articles/mi 7992/is 20100725/ai n54650597/.
172. Turner, 318 S.W.3d at 664.
173. Id. at 670 (Breckenridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
174. See Elisa Crouch, High Court Hits Failing Schools with Tuition Tab, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, July 17, 2010, at Al [hereinafter Tuition Tab], available at
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/article 0d0el eac-21cf-5aa3-80ac-adf631
ObOl 15.html. Missouri Revised Statutes section 167.131.2 governs the cost of tuition
for transfer students from an unaccredited district to an accredited district. See Mo.
REV. STAT. § 167.131.2 (2000); see also supra note 14 for the calcualation of tuiution
under Mo. REV. STAT. § 167.131.2 (2000).
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Another issue is the ability of the transferee districts to collect the tuition
due from an unaccredited district. Clayton previously encountered this prob-
lem after the Wellston School District's loss of accreditation.177 Clayton
accepted Wellston students and billed the Wellston district for their tuition
but faced difficulty in obtaining payment.178 As a debt collector, Clayton had
already seen the potential for problems with section 167.13 1.1 and wanted to
avoid a repeat of the situation.179 Unfortunately for Clayton and the rest of
the accredited school districts in Missouri, the majority's interpretation has
done nothing but magnify the potential for more payment collection prob-
lems.
B. Transportation
Problems with funding for unaccredited districts easily spill over into
the transportation requirements of section 167.131.80 This issue is evident in
the transitional school district. In a recent newspaper article, Superintendent
of Schools Kelvin Adams spoke about the district's problems in effectively
providing transportation for its students.'81 The district's transportation
budget was decreased by nearly $7,000,000 from the 2009-2010 school year
to the 2010-2011 school year.' 82 This decrease required the district to elimi-
nate more than 100 bus routes and 3,000 stops.' 83 The district is trying to
find ways to cut transportation costs without affecting attendance rates.' 84 it
has even half-jokingly considered reimbursing parents for bringing their chil-
dren to school instead of relying on bus transportation. Because section
167.131 requires the unaccredited district to provide transportation to students
attending schools in accredited districts,1 86 it is clear that the majority's inter-
pretation will only exacerbate the transportation problems.
177. Turner, 318 S.W.3d at 675 n.4 (Breckenridge, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
178. See id.
179. Id. at 675.
180. Unaccredited schools are required to "provide transportation consistent with
the provisions of section 167.241 . . . for each pupil resident therein who attends an
accredited school in another district of the same or adjoining county." Mo. REV.
STAT. § 167.131.1 (2000).
181. Elisa Crouch, City Schools Weigh Options on Transporting Students, ST.







186. Mo. REV. STAT. § 167.131.1 (2000).
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The students' choice to attend magnet schools within the district is a
prime cause of the transportation funding problem.187 For example, magnet
schools, like any accredited school under the majority's interpretation, have
no boundaries within the St. Louis Public School District.'88 Students from
all over the district attend the magnet schools and more than eighty percent of
them utilize bus transportation, requiring multiple buses to service the same
neighborhoods.189 This would almost certainly be a similar situation to that
of students who live in the unaceredited district and attend schools in accred-
ited districts. Because of the lack of funding for student transportation, it is
likely that only those students who have parents with cars or alternate means
of getting to school, besides district-supplied bus service, would even be able
to take advantage of section 167.131.
C. Capacity
Clearly, the ability of accredited districts in the same or adjoining coun-
ties to accept an influx of students from unaccredited districts is a huge con-
cern. As the dissent stated, the majority's interpretation requires that the ac-
credited districts accept students from the unaccredited district even if the
number of students wishing to transfer exceeds capacity.190 After the opinion
of the court was issued in mid-July, Clayton filed a motion for rehearing,
which was supported by amicus briefs from the Attorney General of the State
of Missouri,191 Special School District,192 Missouri School Boards' Associa-
tion,193 Voluntary Interdistrict Choice Corporation,' 94 Riverview Gardens
187. See Transporting Students, supra note 181.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Turner v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton, 318 S.W.3d 660, 675 (Mo. 2010) (en banc)
(Breckenridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (per curiam).
191. The Attorney General's brief was submitted on behalf of DESE and its role
in assisting schools in interpreting state law and fulfilling their purpose of educating
the children of Missouri. Suggestions of the Dep't of Elementary and Secondary
Educ. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Motions for Rehearing or to Modify, Turner v.
Sch. Dist. of Clayton, 318 S.W.3d 660 (Mo. 2010) (No. SC90236), available at
http://www.clayton.kl2.mo.us/clayton/lib/clayton/_shared/pdf7Tumer/AGMOSugge
stionsInSupport.pdf.
192. The Special School District is responsible for the education of children with
disabilities who live in St. Louis County. Amicus Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis
County's Suggestions in Support of Sch. Dist. of Clayton's Motion for Rehearing or,
Alternatively to Modify at 1, Turner v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton, 318 S.W.3d 660 (Mo.
2010) (No. SC90236), available at http://www.clayton.kl2.mo.us/clayton/lib/clayton
/_shared/pdf/Turner/SSD_SuggestionsinSupport.PDF. Its brief focused on the impact
of the Turner decision on those children with disabilities who reside within an unac-
credited school district, which is beyond the scope of this Note. Id.
193. The brief submitted by the Missouri School Boards' Association, on behalf
of the public schools of Missouri, focused on the statewide impact of the Turner deci-
9612011]
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School District,195 and Cooperating School Districts of Greater St. Louis
("CSD"). 196
In its brief, CSD included affidavits from twenty-five of the school dis-
tricts potentially affected by the Turner decision. 19 7 Each district's affidavit
sion and the need for appropriate class sizes. Amicus Curia Suggestions in Support of
the Sch. Dist. of Clayton and the Transitional Sch. Dist. of the City of St. Louis' Post-
Disposition Motions for Rehearing or, Alternatively, to Modify at 1, Turner v. Sch.
Dist. of Clayton, 318 S.W.3d 660 (Mo. 2010) (No. SC90236), available at
http://www.clayton.kl2.mo.us/clayton/lib/clayton/ shared/pdf/Turner/MSBA Sugges
tionslnSupport.PDF.
194. The Voluntary Interdistrict Choice Corporation is the corporation created by
the decision in Liddell v. Board of Education in order to assist in the transfer of black
students from St. Louis City schools to St. Louis County schools and white students
from St. Louis County schools to St. Louis City magnet schools. Amicus Curiae
Voluntary Interdistrict Choice Corp.'s Suggestions in Support of Respond-
ent/Defendants' Post-Disposition Motions for Rehearing or, Alternatively, to Modify
at 1-2, Turner v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton, 318 S.W.3d 660 (Mo. 2010) (No. SC90236),
available at http://www.clayton.kl2.mo.us/clayton/lib/clayton/_shared/pdf/Turner/
VICCSuggestionsInSupport.pdf. The brief focused on the impact that the Turner
decision will have on the settlement derived from the Liddell case, which is outside
the scope of this Note. Id.
195. The Riverview Gardens School District is currently the only other unaccred-
ited school district in Missouri. See Accreditation Classification, Mo. DEP'T OF
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., 14 (Dec. 2010), http://dese. mo.gov /div
mprove/sia/msip/documents/qs-si-msip-accreditationclassificationl2142010 000.pdf;
Amicus Curiae Riverview Gardens Scb. Dist.'s Suggestions in Support of Defend-
ants/Respondents' Motions for Rehearing or, Alternatively, to Modify at 1, Turner v.
Sch. Dist. of Clayton, 318 S.W.3d 660 (Mo. 2010) (No. SC90236), available at
http://www.clayton.kl2.mo.us/clayton/lib/clayton/ shared/pdffTumer/RGSDSuggest
ionsInSupport.pdf. The brief submitted by the district focused on the impact of the
Turner decision as the district tries to regain accreditation as well as the district's
reliance on the DESE interpretation of 167.131, which provided that acceptance of
transfer students in an accredited district was discretionary. Id at 1-2.
196. The Cooperating School Districts of Greater St. Louis is a voluntary, non-
profit organization that provides an outlet for St. Louis-area and surrounding county
school districts to "share resources, information and ideas to improve and enrich the
educational programs within the member districts." Amicus Curiae Listed Members
of the Cooperating Sch. Dists. of Greater St. Louis' Suggestions in Support of De-
fendants/Respondents' Post-Disposition Motions for Rehearing or, Alternatively, to
Modify at 1, Turner v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton, 318 S.W.3d 660 (Mo. 2010) (No.
SC90236), available at http://www.clayton.kl2.mo.us/clayton/lib/clayton/_shared/
pdf/Turner/Coop SuggestionslnSupport.pdf. As a representative of many of the
districts affected by the Turner decision, CSD compiled affidavits from those districts
and submitted them with its brief. Id.
197. The districts span four Missouri counties: St. Louis, Franklin, Jefferson, and
St. Charles. Id. at ii. The Riverview Gardens school district, which is also unaccred-
ited, is located in St. Louis County, which borders Franklin, Jefferson, and St. Charles
counties. Id. at 4 n.3. Those twenty-five districts are Afton, Bayless, Brentwood,
962 [Vol. 76
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stated that the district projects enrollment for the next school year as early as
September of the prior year.198 This enrollment calculation is critical to the
ability of each district to accurately project its budget for the next year.
The brief stated that the court's decision - that the districts had no discretion
on whether to admit the transferring students - would severely impact both
enrollment and budgets for each district,200 as they would be forced to accept
transfer students without regard to whether they actually have capacity.201
The affidavits also described the capacity of most of the districts at the time
submitted.202 Nearly every district reported being at capacity at one or more
203
education levels or locations. Every district except Washington reported
that it had been contacted by students of either the Transitional School Dis-
trict or Riverview Gardens interested in enrolling in their schools.204 How are
these districts going to be able to support the additional students if they are
already at capacity?
D. Enforcement
Aside from the problems of capacity, it is unclear how the students of
the unaccredited districts will actually attend the accredited schools in neigh-
Ferguson-Florrisant, Fort Zumwalt, Francis Howell, Hancock, Jennings, Kirkwood,
Ladue, Lindbergh, Maplewood, Mehlville, Meramec Valley, Normandy, Northwest,
Orchard Farm, Parkway, Pattonville, Ritenour, Rockwood, University City, Washing-
ton, Webster Groves, and Windsor. Id. at ii.
198. See, e.g., id. at Exhibit AA.
199. Id. at 3.
200. See id. at Exhibits C-AA.
201. Id. at 1-2.
202. Afton (at capacity at all levels), Bayless (at capacity at all levels), Brentwood
(at capacity at middle and high school levels), Ferguson-Florrisant (not at full capaci-
ty), Fort Zumwalt (at or near full capacity at all levels), Francis Howell (did not give
information about capacity), Hancock (at capacity at all levels), Jennings (near ca-
pacity), Kirkwood (did not give information about capacity), Ladue (at or near capaci-
ty in elementary levels), Lindbergh (at capacity at all levels), Maplewood (at capacity
at all levels), Mehlville (not at capacity), Meramec Valley (did not give information
about capacity), Normandy (at capacity at the elementary level), Northwest ("staffed
to meet at ratios of full capacity at all levels"), Orchard Farm (teaching staff is at full
capacity at several schools), Parkway ("at full capacity levels based on our desired
student-teacher ratio"), Pattonville (at capacity at the middle and high school levels,
limited capacity at the elementary school level), Ritenour (at capacity at the middle
and high school levels), Rockwood (specific schools at capacity), University City (at
capacity at all levels), Washington (at capacity in most buildings, nearing capacity at
several others), Webster Groves (at or near capacity at all levels and anticipating
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boring districts. This uncertainty will likely result in additional court battles.
On the School District of Clayton's website, the Superintendent of Clayton
Schools stated that "[w]e, like dozens of other school districts who could be
impacted by this decision will vigorously defend our position in the best in-
terest of our community." 205 The frequently-asked-questions page of the
Ladue School District's website includes a specific question about Turner and
its impact on Ladue schools, which historically has not accepted nonresident
students on a tuition basis.206
As of the writing of this Note, the accredited districts affected by Turner
have yet to accept any students under the court's interpretation of section
167.131.207 A flier distributed to parents in the unaccredited Riverview Gar-
dens School District told parents that they had a "RIGHT" to transfer their
children to other accredited schools within St. Louis County.20 The flier
went on to advise the parents that their children "can not [sic] be turned away
by law!! !",209 Yet when parents have called accredited schools to inquire
about enrolling their children under section 167.131, the districts are willing
to take their name and number but inform them that they are "waiting for
further . .. clarification on the ruling." 210 An attorney for the Webster Groves
School District noted that by choosing not to accept students under the Turner
ruling, school districts may be opening themselves up to lawsuits.211 A com-
mentator outside of the case voiced the likely thoughts of many by stating,
"suburban districts in the St. Louis area predictably will rack up huge legal
205. Turner v. Clayton: High Court Denies Challenge; Case Moving For-
ward, SCH. DIST. OF CLAYTON (Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.clayton.kl2.mo
.us/clayton/cwp/view.asp?A=3&Q=362568 (internal quotation marks omitted).
206. Ladue Schools Frequently Asked Questions, LADUE SCHS., http:
//beta.ladue.kl 2.mo.us/district/content/main/faqs.shtml (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
The facet of this ruling that is most worrisome as it currently stands is that
it provides neither an exception for schools that do not wish to accept tui-
tion students, nor any exemption when transferring students would result
in overcrowded classrooms or school buildings. We will keep our parents
and patrons apprised of any updates in the status of this case.
Id.
207. See Allison Retka, St. Louis Parents Battle Aftermath ofSupreme Court Win,
Mo. LAW. MEDIA, Dec. 30, 2010 [hereinafter Aftermath], available at http:
//findarticles.com/p/articles/mi 7992/is 20101230/ai n56601297/.
208. Allison Retka, Missouri Supreme Court Won't Modif Schools Ruling, Mo.
LAW. MEDIA, Aug. 29, 2010 [hereinafter Missouri Supreme Court] (internal quotation
marks omitted), available at http://www.thedolancompany.com/view.cfm?rec
ID=625690.
209. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
210. Elisa Crouch & Jessica Bock, District Blocking Student Transfers, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 7, 2010, at Al [hereinafter Districts] (internal quotation marks
omitted).
211. See Missouri Supreme Court, supra note 208.
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bills in order to keep their district lines intact." 212 One has to wonder just
how much more money will need to be spent to obtain a definite resolution.
Since the court's decision requires the accredited districts to accept all
transfer students from unaccredited districts, the question arises as to how that
applies to students who live in the unaccredited districts but were already
attending other schools. As interpreted, it seems that section 167.131 would
allow for any student in the unaccredited district to attend an accredited
school regardless of whether they were attending a public school prior to the
ruling.213 The impact on private and parochial schools currently attended by
students from unaccredited districts could be devastating, as they could face a
similar kind of mass exodus as the unaccredited districts. 214
E. Safety
By requiring accredited school districts to admit transfer students from
unaccredited school districts, the majority's interpretation of section 167.131
effectively nullifies the power of schools to enforce provisions of the Safe
Schools Act. The purpose of the Act was to keep Missouri school children
215
safe. This purpose was to be attained by giving school districts discretion
in choosing whether or not to accept transfer students, either inter- or intra-
district.216 The district also could conduct a hearing if a student was per-
217
ceived as a safety threat. By removing the discretion of the accredited
district to which the student transfers, the majority appears to have opened the
door for the allowance of potentially violent students to attend accredited
schools. Again, this absurd conclusion does not follow the intention of the
legislature, as it potentially puts the resident students of an accredited school
district in danger.
F. Right to a Free Public Education
The majority's interpretation implies that students of unaccredited
schools are able to choose at whim which public school they will attend with-
in the adjoining district.218 By eliminating the discretion of the district to
which the student is transferring, the majority has ultimately given the stu-
dents of the unaccredited district the right to more than just the free public
212. Matthew D. Davis, 'Jane Turner' Verdict Is a Lot like Brown Education -
Missouri Court Ruling for Unaccredited School Districts Will Leave a Troublesome,
Lasting Legacy, ST. Louis PoST-DISPATCH, Aug. 15, 2010, at Al5.
213. Districts, supra note 210.
214. Id.
215. See Burgess, supra note 32, at 604.
216. Mo. REV. STAT. § 167.020.2-.3 (Supp. 2010).
217. Id. § 167.020.2.
218. Turner v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton, 318 S.W.3d 660, 671 (Mo. 2010) (en banc)
(Breckenridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (per curiam).
2011] 965
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education allowed by the Missouri Constitution.219 To a student attending an
unaccredited school, the majority's ruling opens the door to attend, for free,
the public school of his choice in the district of his choice so long as he main-
tains a residence in an unaccredited district. Surely the goal of the legislature
in enacting section 167.131 was not to persuade families to move to unac-
credited school districts in order to take advantage of getting a free public
education at a school of their choosing, but it is very easy to see just how that
could happen.
While the thought of moving to an unaccredited district to receive an
education in the accredited district of choice may seem outlandish, it is im-
portant to consider the reasons many people cite for buying a new home or
moving. One of the most important considerations is the quality of the school
district in which the new domicile is located.220 The quality of the schools in
the St. Louis Public School District has traditionally discouraged families
from moving into the City of St. Louis, or in the alternative, encouraged them
to either move from the district prior to their children reaching school age or
send their children to private school. 221 The low cost of housing as compared
to a school district like Clayton would only encourage families to remain
within the City of St. Louis. The portion of every $100 of property tax at-
tributed to schools is similar within the City of St. Louis 222 and Clayton,22 3
with the City of St. Louis slightly higher. The major difference is in the sales
price of homes within the communities, and thus the basis for property taxes.
In 2006, the median sales price for a home in the neighborhoods of the City
of St. Louis ranged from $15,000.00 to $236,500.00, while the median sales
219. Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a).
220. See Blanche Evans, Realty Viewpoint: Moms Rate Schools Third as the Rea-
son for Moving, REALTY TIMES, Nov. 8, 2008, http://realtytimes.com/rtpages
/20080408 realtyviewpoint.htm. Mothers surveyed about what would motivate them
to move focused on schools and "were willing to trade longer commutes, hold off of
[sic] job transfers and remain in crummier climates to avoid moving children once
they enter school." Id. Moves were usually within thirty miles of their previous resi-
dence and into what they thought of as a superior school district. Id.
221. A very pertinent example of this exodus can be seen in the 2010 census fig-
ures, which showed a loss of about 6,700 adults from the City of St. Louis and more
than 22,000 people seventeen and younger. Doug Moore, Census Shows City Is
"Hollowing Out" Urban Shift: St. Louis and St. Louis County Lose Residents to Out-
er Ring, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 25, 2011, at Al. "For the city to thrive,
people have to feel comfortable raising their kids [t]here." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
222. In 2010, the portion of City of St. Louis property taxes attributed to schools
per $100 of assessed value was $3.99. 2010 Tax Rate, CITY OF ST. Louis,
http://stlouis-mo.gov/government/departments/assessor/documents/upload//201OTax
Ratel.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).
223. In 2010, that amount for Clayton was $3.74. BOE Sets Tax Rate for 2010,
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price in Clayton was $660,000.00.224 If families could continue to live in the
City of St. Louis and automatically send their children to adjoining accredited
districts at no cost, it is certainly more likely that additional families would
move to the City of St. Louis, and those currently living there with school-age
children would stay.225
Requiring acceptance of students from unaccredited districts would ul-
timately lead a portion of the residents of the City of St. Louis to want the
district to remain unaccredited. So long as the district remains unaccredited,
the parents can continue to send their children to the accredited school of
their choice on the tab of the unaccredited district. No statute should intend
this result. While there are many organizational and bureaucratic changes
that must occur to return the district to accredited status, it would be extreme-
ly difficult to make that happen without the full support of the community.
G. Legislative Changes
The Turner decision has provided more questions than answers. All
parties seek clarification on what the ruling means and are contemplating its
effects. Currently, there are no definite answers, but the legislature can and
should change that. Trial courts will have to enforce the Turner ruling,226 but
it is up to the legislature to fix the statute.227 Senator Kurt Schaefer of Co-
lumbia, a member of the Senate Education Committee, has acknowledged
that "legislative action may be warranted." 228 He went on to say that it is
necessary to look to the legislature for a response when districts are unable to
224. Stefene Russell, Neighborhoods: Where We Live, ST. Louis MAGAZINE, Apr.
2006, at 116-17 available at http://www.stlmag.com/St-Louis-Magazine/SLM-
Lists/Neighborhoods/neighborhoods-stimag.pdf. While the costs of living in these
districts vary widely, it is interesting to note that the cost spent per average daily at-
tendance in each district is not that disparate. Id. In 2009, Clayton spent $17,078.00
and St. Louis City spent $16,489.00. See MODESE - CLAYTON, supra note 2;
MODESE - ST. Louis, supra note 1.
225. A mother living in the city of St. Louis has put her home on the market in
hopes of moving to Jefferson County to take advantage of the school system there.
Districts, supra note 210. She made this choice after sending her daughter, a sopho-
more in high school, to a magnet school and later a parochial school. Id. While this
result may be seen as a positive consequence of the decision, it is difficult to say that
it was a consequence intended by the legislature in enacting section 167.131.
226. See Elizabethe Holland & Elisa Crouch, St. Louis Student's Legal Victory
Highlights Unsettled Transfer Issue, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, July 21, 2011 at Al,
available at http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/education/article 3b823925-6453-
5fl0-af3O-51ac2041cc64.html (describing a recent circuit court decision that allowed
for a student residing in the City of St. Louis to enroll in Webster Groves High locat-
ed in St. Louis County).
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take in greater numbers of students, and "[y]ou can't penalize a district for
being successful."229
When faced with just some of the possible repercussions of the ruling, it
is clear that the court's plain-meaning interpretation provides for absurd con-
sequences. One possible way to eliminate these absurd consequences would
be for the legislature to amend section 167.131, changing the "shall" at issue
to a "may," thus giving the accredited districts discretion in admitting transfer
students. This change would limit many of the absurd consequences such as
over-crowding, safety concerns, and enforcement.
Two senate bills addressing the Turner ruling were proposed in the Mis-
souri legislature during the spring 2011 session. Senate Bill 14,230 proposed
by Senator David Pearce of Warrensburg, sought to require the State Board to
establish criteria for admittance of students transferring from unaccredited
districts to adjoining accredited districts.2 3 1 Amending section 167.131 to
require guidelines on acceptance might be helpful to both parents and
schools,232 but what those guidelines should look like is still undecided and
will require additional input from parents, teachers, and school administra-
tion.
Senate Bill 129,233 proposed by Senator Jim Lembke of St. Louis City
and County, sought to exempt any metropolitan school district under the con-
trol of a special administrative board from the requirements of section
167.131.234 This bill applied directly to the St. Louis Public School District,
as it was currently under the control of a special administrative board.235
Exempting these districts would provide the special administrative board the
opportunity to begin correcting problems within a failing district before a
mass exodus of students makes that impossible.236 Both of these bills would
have provided some of the clarification needed for schools and parents to
move forward. Unfortunately, the legislature chose not to act on those bills
before the end of the session237 leaving the affected families and schools in
limbo.
229. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
230. S.B. 14, 96th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011); see Editorial, U-
Turner Our View, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 7, 2011 at A12.
231. Editorial, supra note 230.
232. See id.
233. S.B. 129,96th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011).
234. Id.
235. See id.
236. Editorial, supra note 230.
237. See Holland & Crouch, supra note 226.
[Vol. 76968
28
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 76, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 14
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol76/iss3/14
RSMO 167.131 & UNCONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE
VI. CONCLUSION
Turner's holding - that accredited school districts are required to accept
children from adjoining unaccredited districts - will lead to a multitude of
negative consequences: problems with funding, transportation, capacity, safe-
ty, enforcement issues, complications with the right to a free public educa-
tion, and the possibility of people taking advantage of the ruling. While par-
ents of the children from unaccredited districts are currently left in limbo,
there will certainly be additional, costly adjudication on the issue, further
taking funds away from Missouri public schools. Based on the court's inter-
pretation, it is clear that the time is ripe for the legislature to take action and
amend the language of section 167.131.
As of the writing of this Note, the stay implemented by St. Louis County
Circuit Judge David Lee Vincent, Il has been lifted, and the trial process for
Turner v. School District of Clayton has begun238 with a trial date currently
set for January 23, 2012.239 On October 21, 2010, Judge Vincent denied the
parents' motion for declaratory judgment and stated that the Supreme Court
of Missouri had generally remanded the case to the trial court.24o Judge Vin-
cent noted that this general remand meant that the court was to "resolve all
legal issues between the parties."241 In reaching this resolution, the pleadings
of the parties were open to amendment, which included affirmative defens-
242
es.
Since the Supreme Court of Missouri's decision in June 2010, the par-
ents' lawyer has filed more than a half dozen writs and appeals, all with the
same objective: to direct the parents' tuition bills to Clayton.243 None of
those have been granted, leading all parties to proceed toward trial.244 Only
two of the six children enrolled in Clayton schools when the lawsuit began
are still attending, and one of those two is scheduled to graduate from high
school in 2011.245 One of the sets of parents has dropped out of the lawsuit,
238. See Court Order and Judgment, Turner v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton, No. 07SL-
CC00605 (Cir. Ct. St. Louis County Oct. 21, 2010), available at http://www.clayton
.kl2.mo.us/clayton/lib/clayton/ shared/pdf/Turner/TurnerOrder Oct2010.pdf.
239. Turner v. Clayton: SSD Intervenes; Trial Postponed Until Jan. 2012, SCH.
DISTRICT OF CLAYTON (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.clayton.kl2.mo.us/clayton/cwp/
view.asp?A=3&Q=362568.
240. Court Order and Judgment, at 4.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Aftermath, supra note 207.
244. Id.
245. See Elisa Crouch, Whatever the Outcome, Clayton Tuition Lawsuit Suit Has
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and another would like to, but it is not that simple.246 Clayton and nearly
every other school district have an interest in the outcome of the case and
therefore want it resolved in the courts.247 Clayton has ensured that will hap-
pen by filing a counterclaim against the remaining parents for the 2010-2011
tuition.248
While the parents, Clayton, and the Transitional School District are cur-
rently without answers to many of their questions, it appears that resolution
may not be indefinite. The trial process continues and the Missouri legisla-
ture's session will begin shortly.249
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. Tuition for the 2010-2011 school year had been suspended by the courts
until the case was resolved. Id.
249. Research for this Note concluded on September 20, 2011. There is no doubt
that the issues addressed in this Note will be continual and ongoing.
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